Analysis - New Zealand took another step closer to the US's space operations this week, by joining the satellite-and-debris monitoring Operation Olympic Defender.
In June, it had taken another step, at America's request sending a trainer to Japan to teach its military about monitoring satellites, so Japan can join the New Zealand-led, US-funded hub in Auckland, called the JCO.
In March, yet another move, with the NZDF taking part for the first time in US-led exercises to speed up "kill chains" over the Indopacific using satellites for targeting; and in early June, the government took the very strategic step of signing up to help the US in its new strategy to expand the weapons-making defence industrial base across the Indo-Pacific region.
Defence Minister Judith Collins said sending an officer to Colorado for Olympic Defender was a win-win - they got to watch-and-learn, and the country got to play its part.
"The fact is that we want space to be able to be used for peaceful purposes. I think the partners we're working with on this, that have invited us in, they're very clear on that," she told Morning Report on Friday.
It made sense to join up "in an area where we would have absolutely no hope of protecting our own satellites", Collins said.
Part of Olympic Defender is about deterring hostile actors.
Space, an unfriendly vacuum at the best of times, has rapidly become more hostile for geopolitical reasons.
But what are the threats, and what is New Zealand doing to assess them?
As the proverb goes, when elephants battle, the ants perish. Russia is one of the three largest players, China bigger again, and both are ranged against the US when it comes to space.
New Zealand, tiny, but uniquely placed for intelligence sharing and space launches, is at the US's side - quite practically, such as in Poland, helping train the Ukrainian army in satellite spotting ("space domain awareness", they call it).
Elon Musk also helped, with his thousands of small, cheap Starlink satellites helping Ukraine plan defences and target its guns.
This prompted Russia to issue a threat that Pravda interpreted as being to shoot down the satellites, but it was also a blunt wider warning. This excited US media, but not so much in New Zealand.
"Recently the risks of turning outer space into a springboard for aggression and war have become quite real," the deputy head of Russia's delegation told the UN General Assembly in October 2022.
Konstantin Vorontsov repeated this in 2023.
"We also stress an extremely dangerous trend that goes beyond the scope of innocuous use of space technologies which has become apparent in the course of the events in Ukraine," he said.
"Namely, the use of civil, including commercial, infrastructure components in outer space for military purposes by the United States and its allies.
"Apparently, these states do not fully realise that such activities essentially constitute indirect involvement in armed conflicts.
"We repeat for those who refuse to understand: Quasi civil infrastructure may become a legitimate target for retaliation."
A threat like this makes it a prime time to think about this, as does the fact the military has been thinking about how it needs to fight, and what with, in its new defence capability plan out to 2040, that has sat with Minister Collins for a couple of months now.
So, has New Zealand analysed whether it might become a "target for retaliation", either by Russia, or by China, were the conflict over, say, Taiwan in the Indopacific instead of Ukraine?
Not so that you could tell.
The SIS spy agency's new threat assessment out this week does not mention it. It says only that some outside entities have been trying to build infrastructure here that could help foreign militaries and and harm New Zealand.
RNZ asked the Defence Ministry and NZDF for a copy of any such analysis since 2022.
Neither released any.
Each instead cited only the same two Cabinet documents, from 2023, that laid out the benefits for New Zealand helping the US set up the JCO satellite-monitoring hub in Auckland. The 20 pages of documents have the word "threat" in them twice, in a general sense, and "Russia" once in a footnote. China is not mentioned.
The Cabinet papers do note that the hub is a "commercial-military activity that 'looks up' into space to generate a clear picture of the location and movement of satellites".
It then sends unclassified reports to 500 stakeholders in 11 nations. The papers use the word "surveillance" twice, in a general sense.
Surveillance is a huge priority in space right now. Pentagon-related agencies working on this talk about the benefits - such as, if you spot a threat "you can actually run away", by moving your satellite - and who is doing it: "Our commercial systems are watching what the Chinese in particular are doing on orbit right now."
RNZ also asked the NZDF and ministry for copies of any documents since 2022 about Defence concerns about "counterspace" threats, where conflicts in space might spill over to earth.
Again, neither released any.
The ministry instead referred to a speech and work done opposing anti-satellite missile tests, and it and NZDF both said a Cabinet paper that was relevant would be released soon.
A single document was released about national security and space: This December 2023 report discusses in very general terms work on how to coordinate "space security", being done by the National Security Board. Its plan had been due by now, but has been put off for a year.
The parts of the National Security Board report that are not blanked out mention the US just once, and there is nothing in it about Russia or China, or anything that suggests any consideration of whether New Zealand's space moves might make it a target. It may be that this is contained in the section, "Scoping and defining space security in New Zealand", but this is nearly entirely blanked out. The page on policy risks and opportunities is blanked out, too.
The US, however, has no shortage of analysis of space threats, and whether taking sides is more of a deterrence or makes a country a target.
Rand Corporation, a go-to consultant for the Pentagon, in a 57-page analysis of space wars released this year, has a bob each way.
It argues that letting the enemy see the US and allies' new capabilities from time to time "can enhance the credibility of US threats and deter adversary escalation".
But that is far from certain, for either the countries or companies that line up with the US Space Force: "Expanding collaboration with allies, partner countries, and commercial organizations is a central plank in the US Department of Defense (DoD) space strategy," said Rand.
"Doing so raises the risk of adversary escalation, especially against commercial systems, because China and Russia have indicated their intention to target commercial actors providing space support to DoD."
The analysis also reflects the huge uncertainties in this uncharted territory:
"It is plausible that there exists an offensive advantage in space that generates an incentive to attack first. However, this proposition cannot be fully validated given the fact that conflict in space has not occurred."
The US thinking on this is very clear. "The threat is expanding and international collaboration is essential to strengthen deterrence against hostile actors," its space commanders have said.
New Zealand's thinking and analysis is less clear, and less apparent.