By Jason Young*
Analysis - The dust has settled from Chinese Premier Li Qiang's visit to New Zealand last week. This was a timely visit in an important and complex relationship that indicates both sides seek to maintain stable and productive relations.
It also highlighted the different approaches each side is taking to achieving that goal.
China's public messaging was ambitious and bullish. It played down differences and talked up opportunities for deepening comprehensive cooperation.
New Zealand's public messaging was more cautious and constrained. It looked to moderate expectations and publicly addressed challenging issues in the relationship.
This is quite a shift. During Premier Li Keqiang's visit in 2017, both sides pushed a furious pace of cooperation and few differences were canvassed publicly.
Since then, relations have evolved in line with a more challenging international environment, and the tenor of the conversation has changed.
This was highlighted in the post-meeting media standup with Prime Minister Christopher Luxon. Asked how much of the meeting was spent on cooperation and how much on differences, Luxon tellingly remarked, "maybe 50-50".
Premier Li took a different approach, delivering pre-prepared comments post meeting that sought to persuade New Zealanders to moderate their criticisms and refocus their efforts on cooperation. Li stated, "differences should not become a chasm that blocks exchanges and cooperation between us," suggesting that is exactly what is starting to happen.
Reasons for NZ's approach
The reasons for New Zealand's more modest approach are threefold.
Firstly, trade and most importantly the architecture that supports trade, is already well in place and working well.
The 2008 free trade agreement provides the basic economic architecture for those New Zealand businesses that should engage in the Chinese market to do so.
China already stands as New Zealand's largest trade partner following more than a decade of rapid growth. Businesses heavily exposed to the Chinese market will seek to maintain their market access but are unlikely to want to expand their share of exposure.
These businesses will be pleased with further announcements during the visit, notably the non-reciprocal visa free travel to China, the launch of FTA upgrade negotiations for trade in services, as well as several sectoral agreements for agriculture, and they'll be pleased to have had face time with China's premier.
But they will also be cognisant of the broader challenges in the relationship and looking to moderate their exposure to a single market.
Secondly, differences have emerged as irritants for both sides. These narrow the scope for new cooperation and raise the risk of an Australian-style breakdown in relations.
That breakdown had a very negative impact on Australia's trading relationship with China, something New Zealand businesses will be keen to avoid or at least minimise their exposure to.
The issues are not so different for New Zealand.
New Zealand has publicly critiqued China's human rights record, pushed back on cybersecurity and foreign interference, openly discussed economic resilience and diversification, criticised some Chinese activity in the Pacific, and strengthened defence and security relations with partners that are openly critical of Chinese foreign policy.
Managing these differences takes time and resources and has led to a more cautious approach.
Thirdly, challenges are also evident in each countries' respective views of regional order and multilateral institutions.
As China has grown economically and militarily its relative influence has increased. It has become more openly critical of the regional security architecture that New Zealand relies on for its own security and put forward proposals to reform global governance that do not always sit easily with New Zealand interests and liberal values.
The Indo-Pacific is a more contested region with multiple concerning flashpoints. China's relations with many of New Zealand's closest partners have, to say the least, become far more challenging and competitive.
New Zealand has responded positively to new security minilaterals like AUKUS and economic groupings like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, while China has railed against them.
Such differences suggest further care is needed managing the bilateral relationship.
The more modest approach from New Zealand will be troubling for Chinese officials looking beyond their own statements about the bilateral. They'll be concerned with the trajectory of relations, New Zealand's careful but critical posture, and the public and media reception to the visit.
While New Zealand will be happy that the focus of new initiatives was on supporting a slowing economic relationship, China appears to want to push the relationship forward across multiple domains.
The day before Premier Li left, he called for the upgrading of the 'comprehensive strategic partnership' signed in 2014. That looks overly ambitious in the current context.
Given the range of challenges being managed, New Zealand's more modest approach should be viewed as a pragmatic win and a sign of New Zealand's long-term commitment to the relationship.
Jason Young is the Director of the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre and an Associate Professor in the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations.